Abstract. Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system.
-As Heather et al. pointed out, besides the obvious advantage to security in preventing these commonly and frequently reported attacks, preventing them also allows many unbounded verification approaches (e.g. [2] [3] [4] ) to be meaningful, since they assume the absence of type-flaw attacks; -Further, Ramanujam-Suresh found that the absence of any type-flaw attacks allows us to restrict analysis to well-typed runs only [5] , which is a decidable problem; i.e., security can be decided with analyzing just a single session.
Thus, prevention of type-flaw attacks is a crucial and significant result toward protocol analysis and verification.
However, Heather et al.'s work only considered a basic protocol model with a free message algebra and perfect encryption. Operators such as Exclusive-OR and ciphers such as CBC possess algebraic properties that violate these assumptions. Recent focus in research projects world-wide has been to extend protocol analysis with algebraic properties to accommodate "real-world" protocols (e.g. [6, 7] ). Naturally, a corresponding study into type-flaw attacks would be both crucial and interesting.
With this motivation, we examined several algebraic properties described in the survey by Cortier et al. [8] such as:
-Associative pairing, Commutative encryption, and Monoidal theories that violate the free algebra assumption; -the Prefix property, Homomorphic encryption, and Low-exponent RSA weakness that violate the perfect encryption assumption.
We report our observations in this paper. As our main contribution, we prove that type-tagging prevents all type-flaw attacks under XOR that possesses ACUN properties (Associativity, Commutativity, existence of Unity and Nilpotence). The proof approach is quite general and can be easily extended to other monoidal theories such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also advocate some prudent tagging practices to prevent type-flaw attacks under the other algebraic properties mentioned above.
Organization. In Section 2, we show how type-tagging can prevent type-flaw attacks under XOR using an example. In Section 3, we give a formal treatment of type-flaw attacks in a symbolic model and provide a simpler proof compared to [1] that tagging prevents type-flaw attacks under XOR. In Section 4, we examine how the result withstands each algebraic property and suggest remedies in the form of prudent engineering principles. We sum up with a Conclusion. represents X encrypted with Y using an asymmetric encryption algorithm.). A type-flaw attack is possible on this protocol even in the presence of component numbering (recently presented in [10] ):
Notice the type-flaw in the first message (n a ⊕ b ⊕ i substituted for the claimed N A ) that induces a type-flaw in the second message as well. This is strictly a type-flaw attack since without the type-flaw and consequently without exploiting the algebraic properties, the same attack is not possible.
Component numbering cannot also prevent type-flaw attacks under the Inverse property that allows cancellation much like Nilpotence. Consider operators {+, −}, where + is binary addition, − a unary operator, and 0 a constant. Then, if we change the ⊕ operator in the NSL ⊕ protocol to +, variable N A could be substituted with n a + i − b to form the same attack as with ⊕.
The above attack can be avoided if type-tagging were to be adopted for the elements of the XOR operator:
. This is not replayable as the required Msg α.
and the other is outside. Hence, they cannot be canceled.
A similar reasoning applies to Inverse property for ⊕ instead of Nilpotence. We leave this for the reader to verify.
In the next subsection, we will prove these claims formally.
3 Type-tagging prevents type-flaw attacks: Proof
In this section, we present a formal proof extending an approach presented in [11] that non-unifiability of encryptions (which can be ensured by tagging with component numbers) prevents type-flaw attacks with free operators and a more detailed type-tagging will prevent them under the monoidal XOR operator. Our proof is much simpler than [1] , and more importantly, allows us to easily study extrapolating the result to operators with algebraic properties. Furthermore, being a symbolic protocol model, the framework is quite flexible to include the much needed equational unification for additional equational theories.
Term Alegbra
We start off with a term algebra with mostly free operators except for the XOR operator. ↔ k where t and k are terms; Hash denoted h(t) where t is a term; Signature denoted Sig k (t) where t is a term to be validated using the key k; XOR denoted t 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ t n where t 1 , . . . , t n are terms.
We will drop the superscript → and ↔ if the mode of encryption is irrelevant.
We will call terms with no atoms (but only constants and variables) as parametric terms. We will call a parametric term in which the variables were substituted with variables and/or atoms as a semi-term.
We will assume that the reader is familiar with the standard definitions of syntactic unification, and the most general unifier (mgu). We will write t ≈ t ′ if t and t ′ are unifiable. As usual, subterms are defined to capture parts of messages:
We will call encrypted subterms, hashes and signatures as Compound Terms; we will denote them as CT (T ) for a set of terms, T .
We will denote the type of a variable or atom t as type(t We will call a substitution of a term t to a variable V a "welltyped" substitution, if type(t) = type(V ). We will call a set of substitutions σ well-typed and write well-typed(σ) if all its members are well-typed; otherwise, we call σ ill-typed.
We will assume that all operators in the term algebra except the XOR operator are free of equations of the form t = t ′ where t and t ′ are two different terms. Thus, every equation between two terms that were not constructed with the XOR operator is of the form t = t. We will denote this theory, E STD .
On the other hand, we will assume that terms created with the XOR operator to contain the following equational theory denoted E ACUN corresponding to it's ACUN algebraic properties:
We will denote the unification algorithms for terms constructed purely with the standard operators and purely with the XOR operator as A STD and A ACUN respectively.
Terms constructed using both the standard operators and the XOR operator can be unified using A STD , A ACUN and the combination algorithm of Baader & Schulz [12] resulting in a finite number of most general unifiers.
Strands and Semi-bundles
The protocol model is based on the strand space framework of [2] .
Definition 3. [Node, Strand, Protocol]
A node is a tuple Sign, Term denoted +m when it sends a term m, or −m when it receives m. The sign of a node n is denoted sign(n) that can be '+' or '−' and its term as term(n) derived from the term algebra. A strand is a sequence of nodes denoted n 1 , . . . , n k if it has k nodes. Nodes in a strand are related by the edge ⇒ defined such that if n i and n i+1 belong to the same strand, then we write n i ⇒ n i+1 . A parametric strand is a strand with all parametric terms on its nodes. A protocol is a set of parametric strands.
Protocol roles (or parametric strands) can be partially instantiated to produce semi-strands containing semi-terms on nodes obtained instantiating their parametric terms, depending on the knowledge of agents concerning the variables being instantiated: A variable is instantiated to an atom if the agent to which the strand corresponds to, either creates the atom according to the protocol or knows the value (e.g. being public such as an agent name). Variables may also be replaced with new variable substitutions in order for different semi-strands of the same parametric strand to be distinguishable. This is done if more than one instance of a role is visualized in an execution scenario.
We will denote the substitution to a parametric strand 'p' by an honest agent leading to a semi-strand 's' as σ h s p. For instance, role 'A' in the NSL ⊕ protocol is the parametric strand
and an agent 'a' that plays the role could be the semi-strand
A set of semi-strands is a semi-bundle. We will denote the set of all substitutions to a protocol by honest agents leading to a semi-bundle S as σ H S . We will assume that honest agent substitutions leading to semi-strands are always well-typed: Assumption 1 Let P be a protocol and S be a semi-bundle such that
We will use the relation 'precedes' ( ) on stand-alone strands in semibundles: Let s be a strand in a semi-bundle S. Then, (∀n i , n j ∈ s)(i ≤ j ⇒ n i n j ). We will abuse the notation of CT () on strands, protocols and semi-bundles as well. We will write t ∈ S even if t is a term on some node of some strand of a semi-bundle S.
Constraints and Satisfiability
We use the constraint solving model of Millen-Shmatikov [13] that was later modified by Chevalier [14] to model the penetrator 3 . The main constraint satisfaction procedure, denoted P ⊕ first forms a constraint sequence from an interleaving of nodes belonging to strands in a semi-bundle:
Further, if i < j and n i , n j belong to the same strand, then n i n j and (∀i = 1 to k)(T i ⊆ T i+1 ).
A symbolic reduction rule applied to a constraint m : T is said to "reduce" it to another constraint m : T ′ or m ′ : T . P ⊕ applies a set of such rules R ⊕ (Table 1) in any order to the first constraint in a sequence that does not have a variable as it's target, called the "active constraint". It is worth mentioning that P ⊕ eliminates any stand-alone or free variables in the term set of a constraint before applying any rule. Table 1 . Set of reduction rules,
The rules in Table 1 do not affect the attacker substitution. There are two other rules that involve unification, and generate a new substitution that is to be applied to the whole sequence before applying the next rule. It is worth giving a more detailed account of those rules including the transformation to the constraints before the active constraint (C < ) and the ones after (C > ):
A sequence of applications of reduction rules on a constraint sequence can transform it into a "simple" constraint sequence:
Definition 5. [Simple constraint sequence]
A constraint m : T is a simple constraint if m is a variable. A constraint sequence C is a simple constraint sequence if every constraint in C is a simple constraint.
The possibility of forming bundles from a given semi-bundle can be determined by testing if constraint sequences from it are satisfiable. Satisfiability is usually defined in terms of attacker operations on ground terms; however, Chevalier [14] proved that P ⊕ is terminating, sound and complete with respect to the attacker capabilities. Hence, we define satisfiability directly in terms of the decision procedure:
A constraint is satisfiable if a sequence of reduction rule application from R result in a simple constraint. A constraint sequence C is satisfiable if every constraint in the sequence is satisfiable. Further, the initially empty substitution σ is said to satisfy C, denoted σ ⊢ C.
It is useful to characterize "normal" constraint sequences which are those that do not contain pairs on the left and right sides of any constraint:
A constraint sequence C is normal iff for every constraint m : T ∈ C, m is not a pair and for every t ∈ T , t is not a pair.
It has been proven in [14] that any constraint sequence can be "normalized" such that if a substitution satisfies the original sequence, it can also satisfy the normalized sequence.
Violations of trace properties such as secrecy and authentication can be embedded in a semi-bundle so that a satisfiable constraint sequence from the semibundle points to an attack. Using this concept, we define a type-flaw attack:
Definition 8. [Type-flaw attacks]
A type-flaw attack exists on a semi-bundle S if a constraint sequence C from S is satisfiable with an ill-typed substitution, but not with a well-typed
Main requirement -Non-Unifiability of Terms
We will now state our main requirement on protocol messages which states that textually distinct compound terms should be non-unifiable and that all XORed terms must be type-tagged:
[NUT] Let P be a protocol. Then P is NUT-Satisfying iff -(∀t 1 ∈ CT (P ))(∀t 2 ∈ CT (P ))(t 1 = t 2 ⇒ t 1 ≈ t 2 ).;
It can be easily seen that NUT for terms constructed with standard operators is achieved by placing component numbers as the beginning element of concatenations inside all distinct compound terms in a protocol. E.g. The tagged NSL ⊕ protocol in Section 2 clearly conforms to these stipulations and hence is a NUT-Satisfying protocol.
Main result
We will now prove that NUT-Satisfying protocols are not vulnerable to type-flaw attacks.
The main idea is to show that every unification when applying P ⊕ to a constraint sequence from a NUT-Satisfying protocol results in a well-typed unifier.
The intuition behind showing that unifiers are necessarily well-typed is as follows: informally, the problem of unification of two terms under the combined theory of (E STD ∪ E ACUN ) must first result in subproblems that are purely in E STD or purely in E ACUN according to Baader-Schulz algorithm. Now E ACUN problems will have a unifier only if the XOR terms contain variables. However, according to our extended requirement of NUT above, no protocol term has an XOR term with an untagged variable. Further, the XOR terms produced by P ⊕ in the term set of a constraint cannot contain variables either since like in P, the rule (elim) eliminates any stand-alone variables in a term set before applying any other rule. Thus, algorithm A ACUN returns an empty unifier. Unification of E ACUN problems only happens when two standard terms that were replaced by variables belong to the same equivalence class, can be unified with A STD and could thus be canceled.
In summary, the unifier for a problem in (E STD ∪ E ACUN ) under the extended requirement on NUT is only from applying A STD . We show that these problems always produce well-typed unifiers.
For instance, consider the unification problem
Following Baader & Schulz method, we first purify this to sub-problems:
Now, the new variables W , X, Y , and Z are treated as constants during A ACUN . In that case, the problem W = X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z is not unifiable. However, there is a step we missed: we need to form equivalence classes from the variables W , X, Y , and Z such that variables from one class can be replaced with just one representative element. In this case, if we partition the variables into { { W }, { X }, { Y, Z } }, then we can change
with an additional problem of Y ? ≈ E STD Z. This is obviously equivalent to
≈ E STD X since the Y 's cancel out leading to another sub-problem. Now all the sub-problems are purely in the STD theory (terms on either sides do not involve the ⊕ operator):
It can be easily seen that A STD outputs a well-typed unifier ({n a /N B , b/A}) for these problems resulting in a well-typed unifier for a combination of A STD and A ACUN , since A ACUN outputs an empty unifier.
Theorem 1. [NUT prevents type-flaw attacks]
Let P be a NUT-Satisfying protocol and S = σ H S P . Let C be a normal constraint sequence from S. Then,
Proof. If σ satisfies C, then from Def. 6, rules from R ⊕ have been used to reduce it to a simple constraint sequence. The only rules that can change σ are (un) and (ksub). (ksub) makes a well-typed substitution since it unifies a term with the attacker's public-key which is of the same type. We prove below that if m : T ∪t ∈ C, and m ≈ t then for each mgu(m, t) = τ , well-typed(τ ). Since initially σ is empty, using induction on each constraint of the sequence, we can then conclude that σ is well-typed.
Following the combination algorithm of [12] described in [15] , let the initial
≈ t n }; -Let Γ ′ be pure with every m ≈ E t ∈ Γ ′ have m, t formed purely from operator ⊕ on 0, constants and variables or from the standard theory in the term algebra defined in Def. 1; -< is a linear ordering on variables such that if X < Y then Y does not occur as a subterm of the instantiation of X; -p is a partition {V 1 , V 2 } on the set of all variables V such that V 2 are treated as constants when A STD is applied and V 1 are constants when A ACUN is applied; -Let another partition p ′ of variables identifies equivalence classes of V where every class in a partition is replaced with a representative and where members of the class are unifiable;
Let the combined unifier of σ STD and σ ACUN denoted σ ST D ⊙ σ ACUN = σ which is obtained by applying [15, Def. 9] ; i.e., by induction on <. Our aim is to prove that every σ obtained for different combinations of <, p, p ′ is well-typed. Let us examine the possible forms of problem elements in Γ ′ : ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a i } and b ∈ {b 1 , . . . , b j } is a constant or a new variable in V for some positive i and j. The reason is as follows: according to the requirement on protocol messages for a NUT-Satisfying protocol, none of {a 1 , . . . , a i } can be an untagged variable. Also, none of {b 1 , . . . , b j } is a variable, since P ⊕ applies rule (elim) eliminating all stand-alone variables before applying any other rule. Lastly, the new variables in m and t would be other problems in Γ ′ of the form X = [tag, x] where X is the new variable, tag is a constant and x is any term. These new variables have to be treated as constants when applying A ACUN (they cannot be substituted with 0's which is the only substitution that A ACUN can return). With all constants in m and t, A ACUN that would normally return a set of '0' substitutions for some variables, returns an empty set of substitutions answering that m and t are equivalent (if they are); STD theory: m ≈ STD t where 1. either m or t is a new variable belonging to V ; there is no unifier to existing variables here; 2. m, t are tagged terms of the form, [tag, x] and [tag, x ′ ] where tag is a constant. In this case, m unifies with t only if x unifies with x ′ and the proof can be applied recursively; 3. m, t ∈ CT (S); In this case, again the proof applies recursively. For instance, if m = h(m ′ ) and t = h(t ′ ) then we need to unify m ′ and t ′ ; Suppose m ′ = [tag, x 1 , . . . , x n ] and t ′ = [tag, y 1 , . . . , y n ]. The constant tag guarantees that m ′ and t ′ have the same number of elements (n). Now we need to unify every x i with y i for i = 1 to n. Firstly, if one of x i and y i is a variable, then:
-If x i or y i is a new variable, there is no substitution to existing variables; -If both are existing variables, then they are both of the same type by Def. 9 and Assumption 1; similarly if one of them is an atom; If x i , y i ∈ CT (S), then the proof proceeds recursively to each subterm in turn. 4. m and t are two new variables in a subset of the variable identification partition p ′ . However, since both are problems in Γ ′ are such that they map to a tagged pair or compound term in the standard theory, their unifier is once again well-typed from above. Note that m and t cannot be existing variables since these variables are from ACUN problems and ACUN problems contain necessarily new variables as explained previously in the case for ACUN theory.
More algebraic properties
We now consider some more algebraic properties of message operators. The first set breaks the free algebra assumption for protocol messages like XOR. The second set breaks the perfect encryption assumption.
Algebraic properties with equational theories
Monoidal theories. Following the definition of monoidal theories from [16] , we can determine that -the theory ACU over {+, 0} where A stands for associativity, C for commutativity and U for the existence of Unity is a monoidal theory; -the theories ACUIdem and ACUN where Idem stands for Idempotence and N for Nilpotence are also monoidal theories over {+, 0} and {⊕, 0} respectively; -the theory of Abelian Groups (AG or ACUInv) over {+, −, 0} where Inv stands for Inverse is also monoidal where − is a unary operator.
If we replace or overload the ⊕ operator in Section 3 with Idem or Inv, we can make a similar reasoning as made for ACUN properties in Theorem 1:
When the combination algorithm of Baader & Schulz is applied for E STD ∪E T where T is a theory with any, some or all of A, C, U, N, Idem, Inv, the algorithm for T, say A T will return an empty substitution when the operator with theory is so used in the protocol such that every term is type-tagged. Consequently, the unifier for the combined unification problem will only have substitutions from A STD which will be well-typed as explained in Theorem 1.
However, we must note that the procedure P ⊕ in [14] that we followed only considered ACUN properties. We conjecture that if a suitable constraint solving algorithm is developed for other monoidal theories as well, then the above concept of necessarily well-typed unifiers could be used to extend Theorem 1 under those theories. It should be straightforward to extend the formal proof that we outlined for associativity of pairing to the cases of associativity and commutativity of a general operator.
Algebraic properties with cipher weaknesses
Some algebraic properties violate the perfect encryption assumption, without altering the freeness of the message algebra. If they produce subterms, like the following inference rule due to Coppersmith [17] , the main theorem still stands tall since unification in the STD theory will still be well-typed (recall the steps of STD theory unification in the proof of Theorem 1 that handles the case of m ≈ STD t -they consider m and t being subterms of the semi-bundle): Clearly, since this inference produces a subterm ('x'), the main result stands tall in its presence and no type-flaw attacks can be possible if the protocol obeys NUT.
Some others produce non-subterms such as the Prefix property and homomorphic encryption discussed in [8] . Let us examine if and how prudent tagging could be adopted to prevent type-flaw attacks under these properties: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a proof that adopting type-tagging for message fields in a protocol prevents type-flaw attacks under the ACUN properties induced by the most popular Exclusive-OR operator. We also extrapolated those results to many other interesting and commonly encountered theories.
We did not find a single property under which component numbering prevents type-flaw attacks that type-tagging cannot, although we presented several examples where the opposite could be true. However, we advocate the use of component numbering in addition to type-tagging, since they prevent the replay of different terms with the same type as well.
The most significant advantage of being able to prevent type-flaw attacks is that analysis could be restricted to well-typed runs only. This has been shown to be a decidable problem in the standard, free theory but not for monoidal theories. We are currently in this pursuit 5 .
